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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives and background 
With €9 billion of invested assets in Europe in 
2012, the impact investment market can no longer 
be described as in its infancy1 . It is a burgeoning 
sector of the financial markets and gaining in 
recognition as well as scale. With such promise 
for achieving social returns, now is an appropriate 
time to consider how these impact investors are 
approaching impact measurement. How much 
impact is actually being achieved, and what effects 
can we really expect to be assessed?
This paper is the second in a series of LSE 
publications on measuring non-financial returns 
to impact investing, as part of a project supported 
by the European Investment Bank University 
Research Sponsorship (EIBURS) Programme. 
Its aim is to draw out points of convergence and 
divergence in approaches to impact measurement, 
based on information derived from a series of 
interviews with impact investors conducted 
between July and November 2013.
Our starting point for analysis is set out in the first 
paper in this series entitled ‘Measuring impact and 
non-financial returns in impact investing: a critical 
overview of concepts and practice’ (Reeder and 
Colantonio, 2013). This emphasised how impact 
investing involves the combination of social, 
environmental, governance and financial goals in 
the application of [financial] capital, underpinned 
by the measurement of the impact generated by 
the actual investment process.  The paper put 
forward six key propositions which the interviews 
set out to test and explore. These included: 
• There are two different forms of measurement 
practice culture, with ‘system builders’ aiming 
for assessments that are as objective, robust and 
quantified as possible, and ‘case by case’ advocates 
wishing to produce assessments focused on the 
specific ‘here and now’; 
• Concepts of what should be measured and 
covered within ‘impact’ and ‘non-financial return’ 
or ‘wider value’ are far from settled;
1 page 23 of European SRI study 2012 (2012), Eurosif
• The conceptual case for creating a single metric 
of value is highly contested;
• Conceptual frameworks have often downplayed 
the category of risk;
• Some influential systems of measurement impact 
have a mixture of ‘subjective’ as well as ‘objective’ 
measures;
• There are observable tensions between an 
organisation wishing to tailor its measurement to 
its own situation, and the constraints imposed by 
a standardised framework.
A further issue raised in the initial working paper 
was that of divergent practice between pre- 
and post- investment assessment of social and 
environmental returns. 
1.2  Interviews with impact  
investors
In order to explore and address these propositions 
further, we conducted a series of interviews of 
investors in the fields of the environment; social 
enterprise; microfinance; and social impact bonds 
financing (some investors covered more than one 
category). The sample of interviewees was based 
on recommendations for well-established impact 
investors who: 
(i) Manage investment funds with the explicit aim 
of generating both a financial and social return. 
The level of financial returns varied significantly 
across investors, though none saw any necessary 
conflict between seeking to generate both a social 
and financial return; 
(ii) Are based in the European Union; and 
(iii) Are active contributors to the impact investing 
debate.
In addition, our sample was chosen to incorporate 
investors with a blend of motivations. Some 
impact funds were backed by public sector 
funds, charitable foundations or high net worth 
individuals and philanthropists, and tended to 
be more willing to take a lower financial return. 
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3Others were backed by institutional investors, 
corporates or pension funds, and tended to seek 
a higher financial return. We also included two 
venture philanthropy organisations who share a 
focus on supporting sustainable organisations to 
achieve social return but whose ‘investments’ are 
in the form of non-repayable grants.
The chosen investors were asked to explain the 
social and financial goals of their organisations, 
explain the role of impact measurement in their 
investment process, discuss their measurement 
methodology, and recommend ways to improve the 
state of impact measurement. In total, interviews 
were held with 15 organisations – Alterfin, Ashoka, 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Big Issue Invest, 
Big Society Capital, Bridges Ventures, DOB 
Foundation, Impetus – Private Equity Foundation, 
Phi Trust Partenaires, Quadia, responsAbility, 
Social Finance, Social Venture Fund, Triodos 
Investment Management, and Triple Jump. 
1.3 Structure of report
The remainder of this report has been structured 
into two main parts. Section 2 discusses the 
approaches taken to impact measurement, 
drawing on evidence gathered through the 
interviews; and Section 3 draws conclusions on the 
propositions set out above. 
2. APPROACHES TO IMPACT 
MEASUREMENT 
Impact measurement can take place 
within different stages of the investment 
process, as shown in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 Stages involved in the  
investment and impact measurement 
process
This section considers a number of questions on 
impact measurement throughout these stages in 
relation to the following specific propositions:  
 
• What forms of impact measurement 
terminology were used by the interviewees? 
• What were the main dimensions of ‘impact’, 
from their perspective? 
• How were the ‘impact’ themes and domains 
conceptualised as a preliminary to undertaking 
measurement? 
• What were the views on forming a single metric 
of impact and/or integrating financial and non-
financial return? 
• To what extent were ‘causal links’ between the 
investment activity and its impact examined?  
• What group and network arrangements to build 
up and share knowledge or other resources  are 
most useful? 
• What different ‘mind-sets’ were observed in 
respect of measurement? 
• To what extent is pre- and post-investment 
impact assessment carried out effectively?   
These issues are considered in the remainder of 
this section in turn.
2.1 Terminology used -  
outputs, outcomes and impact 
An important distinction in impact measurement 
is between the outputs2 ; outcomes3 ; and impact 
(changes in outcomes)4  that result from actions 
funded by the investment. 
Outputs tend to be easier to measure, but neglect 
the value to the beneficiary. And outcomes are 
generally easier to assess than the change in 
outcomes that is due to the value creator, with 
the task of assessing attribution to a reasonable 
standard of robustness often being difficult.
All of those impact investors interviewed for 
this paper were content to use a terminology of 
outputs, outcomes and impact. It is worth noting 
that there is the same consistency does not exist in 
the frontline field of impact measurement. Social 
analysts and researchers often use a broader 
range of terminology. For example, advocates of 
the Outcome Star measurement tool prefer an 
alternative terminology of ‘end outcomes’ (the 
2 The relevant activities completed as part of the inter-
vention (for example, the number of loans approved, serv-
ice users who complete a training course, counselling ses-
sions completed, sales made etc.).
3 The direct change in the beneficiary that has been 
caused by the intervention (for example, a would-be en-
trepreneur obtains access to finance).
4 The change in those outcomes (for example, an entre-
preneur given additional loan financing is able to expand 
their business and move out of poverty).
final outcomes that the beneficiary receives), and 
‘distance travelled’ (which relates to the change in 
outcomes) (MacKeith, 2012).
The distinction between outputs and outcomes 
raises two themes which are central to 
understanding an investor’s approach to impact 
measurement. Firstly, a preference for judging 
performance in terms of outcomes, not outputs. 
Secondly, an attempt to assess impact (also known 
as distance travelled, or value added), in terms of 
changes in outcomes. The extent to which they 
have and have not been assessed by the various 
impact investors is covered in more depth in the 
discussion on causal links between activity and 
outcomes in section 2.7 of this paper.
2.2. Dimensions of impact
Bridges Ventures has an approach to outlining the 
elements that comprise impact as follows: 
1. Scale – broadly the number of people affected 
(rated on a scale from 1 to 3);
2. Depth – a subjective assessment of the degree of 
impact on their lives (rated from 1 to 3); 
3. Systemic impact – the wider effects that the 
scheme may have, such as whether the basic ideas 
are picked up by entrepreneurs in other countries 
(also rated on a scale from 1 to 3). 
Figure 2 Three main roles within impact investing
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Many other interviewees had similar distinctions. 
Big Society Capital, for instance, currently assesses 
the extent to which change will be delivered 
according to the ‘Depth’ of impact; the ‘Breadth’ 
of impact; the extent to which ‘Systemic impacts’ 
will be delivered; and the effect on frontline 
capability. AUM microfinance considers impact 
in terms of ‘Reach’, ‘Efficiency and Effectiveness’ 
and ‘Client protection’.
Ashoka take a slightly different but related 
perspective, looking for social entrepreneurs that 
have a systems-changing new idea; that are highly 
creative in goal setting and problem solving; that 
have high entrepreneurial skills; and that have 
‘ethical fibre’. 
A number of investors often argued that assessing 
scale involves not just counting the number of 
people supported, but also whether they are the 
‘right’ (or suitable) target group for the activity 
funded by the investment. For example, several 
microfinance investors valued the PPI (progress 
out of poverty index) to assist in effective targeting. 
The dimensions of ‘Scale’ and ‘Depth’ relate to 
direct effects on beneficiaries; ‘Systemic Impact’ 
relates to wider, indirect effects. Although only 
four interviewees explicitly mentioned systemic 
effects, all others touched upon it in discussion in 
some way or other. 
Discussions on the concept of ‘wider, indirect 
effects’ included suggestions that it relates to such 
themes as demonstrating the effectiveness of a 
broad category of idea; outlining new forms of 
organisation; showing new types of relationship 
between elements of a system; and challenging 
widely held norms and prejudices. Especially for an 
intervention which is not yet mainstreamed, some 
investors seemed willing in certain circumstances 
to trade off measurable direct impact against 
immeasurable long term wider effects. 
One investor saw systemic change as coming 
through such factors as empowerment (proof 
of the effectiveness of changing the balance 
of power between client and enterprise); and 
prevention (evidence of the effectiveness of a long 
term preventative approach). They cited Shared 
Lives Plus (an enterprise supporting people with 
learning difficulties to be cared for in the homes 
of local families, rather than in institutions) as 
a project that is having the effect of changing 
mindsets as to whether safe and effective care 
can be delivered to vulnerable people in a non-
institutional context.  
Similarly, Ashoka also see a crucial role of changing 
mindsets within their work. As they put it, in 
tackling a major social problem such as malaria, 
“it’s not about how many mosquito nets you sell”. 
Instead, for this illustrative issue, Ashoka would 
look for such factors as whether the fight against 
the disease is being enhanced more generally 
by new affordable approaches being promoted 
by markets; whether public policy and industrial 
norms are being reshaped; whether marginalised 
populations are being integrated into activities; or 
whether more people are being enabled to become 
social problem solvers.
Time scales are also seen as an important 
dimension. In particular, the majority of investors 
interviewed were interested in ensuring that 
impact was sustained beyond the period of their 
investment – as often the bulk of the social value 
of an intervention comes not from the direct 
beneficiaries this year or next, but the stream of 
beneficiaries that will come as the intervention 
reaches greater scale. 
While most social enterprise investors 
were hopeful of such diffusion possibilities, 
microfinance investors had widely different 
perspectives. Those with socially minded 
underlying clients were keen to explore the 
boundaries of the intervention, experimenting 
with microfinance in more unexpected situations, 
such as rural environments. For others, the 
purpose of measurement was to help scaling as 
much as to understand direct impact; investors in 
this category were interested in finding out what 
measures would most help their attempts to scale 
their interventions. 
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2.3  Developing strategic  
impact goals
Largely, although investors focused on small 
number of social goals, these tend to be broad 
reaching (for example children and youth, 
environment) - few investors in our sample have 
defined specific indicators for impact within 
each goal. One exception is NESTA Investment 
Management. Although its fund targets impact 
in three areas – ageing well, children and young 
people and sustainable communities – it has 
clearly defined indicators within each area.  For 
example, within ‘ageing well’ they employ three 
key indicators: ‘reduction in avoidable injury and 
premature deaths of older people’, ‘increase in the 
number of older people ‘enjoying a high quality 
of life’ and ‘participating in social, cultural and 
economic life’. 
At a fund level, most investors either generated 
their own specific objectives for social impact, or 
had them provided for them by their clients - the 
ultimate source of funds.  Only one interviewee 
mentioned any systematic attempt to seek 
guidance on what their impact goals should be, in 
this case from sector experts. 
Smaller organisations we spoke to, who had 
closer relationships with private clients, were 
able to comment on what these clients found 
most appealing; one mentioned clean energy, 
sustainable consumption, green housing and food 
and nutrition in particular. Private clients tended 
to be attracted by a narrative that appealed to 
their individual interests rather than impact data. 
None of the investors we spoke to consulted with 
beneficiaries in order to decide on or refine their 
goals. Two interviewees suggested that they 
picked some of their goals precisely because they 
were measurable, and therefore they believed that 
it would be easier to track progress against them. 
2.4  Conceptualising and  
identifying impact themes and 
domains 
For all interviewees, an essential step was to 
determine whether a possible investment was 
eligible to be included in their portfolio, as 
determined by adherence to a list of set criteria, 
which tends to cover such topics as geographical 
area where investments could be made, 
required size of investment, likely liquidity of 
the investment, and the mission of the potential 
investee. The latter aspect of mission (for example, 
financial inclusion, education or the environment) 
was a determining factor for qualification. 
The question of confirming that the potential 
investee was aligned to the social mission of the 
fund was taken seriously, though such social 
missions can be defined in both specific and broad 
terms:
• Impetus-PEF concentrate wholly on getting 
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds 
into education, training and employment; 
Figure 3 Different scenarios for different types of outcomes
‘Core outcome’ required by those 
paying for goods and services
Not a ‘core outcome’ required by those 
paying for goods and services
Intrinsic to what the enterprise does Impact - Government pays social 
enterprise for reducing reoffending in 
ex-prisoners
Impact - Social enterprise running a 
bakery provides job opportunity to ex-
prisoners
Add-on activity  for the enterprise Law firm makes a charitable donation to 
a local free advisory service
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• NESTA’s Investment Management’s policy is 
to focus on solutions to three key challenges – 
meeting the problems of an aging population; 
meeting the needs of children and young people; 
and enhancing the social and environmental 
sustainability of communities;
• Ashoka look to strengthen citizens’ abilities to 
solve problems, building a ‘everyone a change 
maker’ world;  
• Big Issue Invest’s mission is to back sustainable 
social enterprises that help tackle poverty and 
inequality. 
As consideration evolves into the due diligence 
phase, there continues to be emphasis on the 
organisation, management, process and mission 
of the investee. Particular attention is paid by most 
to the extent to which the investor would adhere to 
its social mission, reassurance that this mission is 
working well currently, and reassurance that this 
can be successfully delivered in the future. Most 
of our interviewees undertake consultation with 
local stakeholders, including the beneficiaries 
of the programme, in order to understand if a 
particular intervention works for them. 
Several investors, among them Impetus-PEF and 
Bridges Ventures, generally create a logic model 
that specifies the impact to be expected from the 
activities funded by the investment; as well as a 
conceptual model outlining the mechanism by 
which that impact will be achieved. 
Big Issue Invest employs a scorecard approach 
with 16 criteria to assess a prospective investee. 
Understanding the potential for scaling the 
depth and breadth of social impact is a key 
factor in this assessment. However, so too is a 
consideration of how embedded the impact is into 
the organisation’s legal structure and underlying 
business model. This is considered critical for 
identifying the risk of future mission drift – an 
issue that is taken seriously; Big Issue Invest made 
a decision in one case not to continue with an 
investment where they felt the risk of mission drift 
as the organisation grew commercially would be 
too great.
In the interviews, Impetus-PEF highlighted a role 
for greater understanding of the ‘user journey’ 
towards better outcomes; while Bridges outlined 
their preference for a logic model that had the 
links between activities and outcomes supported 
by evidence, with the strength of these links 
evaluated in order to understand impact risk (as 
well as potential impact). 
There was, however, a wide variety of approaches 
undertaken; some, such as NESTA Investment 
Management, rely upon a ‘narrative’ that 
described the key outcomes and how they would 
be obtained. By contrast, Social Finance has an 
inclination to utilise pre-existing quantitative 
Figure 4  Two different forms of measurement practice culture
Central task Forms of human relationships
System builders Produce a system that is as objective, robust, 
and  quantified as possible
Expert to expert interactions designed to build 
up a body of knowledge  
Expert to audience communications designed to 
disseminate knowledge
Case by case Produce an assessment that informs stakehold-
ers of the full social value
Facilitator role played to draw out stakeholder 
views on key outcomes 
Focus is on the ‘here and now’, not on what other 
assessors have done in the past
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modelling that showed statistical linkages, and 
statistical effects, upon outcomes that already had 
traction within a given sector. 
Whichever process was used to conceptualise 
impact, the sets of measures used to determine 
progress on impact tends to be a mixture of 
measures of ‘ethical behaviour’ combined with 
achievement of hard-edged outcomes. One 
important instance for this is the set of key 
principles advocated by the ‘Social Performance 
Taskforce’ in respect of microfinance 5:
• Employment creation and enterprises financed;
• Avoiding levels of too much debt;
• Social responsibility to the environment;
• Transparent and responsible pricing;
• Poverty outreach;
5 See http://iris.thegiin.org/materials/microfinance-
metrics-mix-and-sptf
• Appropriate collections practices;
• Ethical staff behaviour;
• Mechanisms for redress of grievances; and
• Privacy of client data. 
2.5  Assessing volatility in  
outcomes (outcome risk)
A new area for assessment that emerged from 
the interviews was that of ‘impact risk’. This is 
the measure of how likely an organisation is to 
remain faithful to the methods and approach 
that underpin an intervention’s success. Where 
an intervention has been well evidenced (and 
where external circumstances do not differ 
and substantially affect results), it may not be 
necessary to re-do all the same data gathering 
during the investment period, but instead monitor 
the systems and processes as indicators of whether 
Figure 5 Characteristics of selected techniques for measuring impact
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the same approach is indeed being taken. Only two 
of the investors we interviewed raised the issue of 
impact risk, and stated that it is a key part of their 
assessment criteria.
One argued that a substantial minority of impact 
investors were at risk of replicating interventions 
with respectable financial prospects but poor 
evidence of impact, giving themselves easy to hit 
metrics that failed to capture the extent of real 
change for clients and society. 
The other outlined their approach, which is 
to assess the likely volatility in outcomes with 
respect to the standard of evidence available, 
rather than using statistics of past (or modelled 
simulation) volatility. Three levels of evidence 
are used: if the logic chain of the impact creator is 
strongly supported by general evidence, then the 
intervention scores a level 1; if there is observational 
evidence from the particular intervention, then it 
scores a level 2; the availability of directly relevant 
RCT or other high quality evidence puts the 
intervention at a level 3. 
However, although most investors’ processes were 
not systematic, the basic principles are reflected 
in other more standard assumptions made by 
investors – where social impact is an implicit part of 
an organisation’s service or product offering then 
financial success implies that they are delivering 
the impact that their commissioners or service 
users are expecting.  
2.6  Single metric of impact 
and/or the integration of  
financial and non-financial  
return
Among our sample of interviewees, social and 
financial returns were generally considered as 
separate dimensions, rather than items of value 
that could be readily synthesised into a single 
metric. For instance, one investor was developing 
a balanced scorecard approach based on a social 
dimension (promoting the ‘quality of being 
human’); effectiveness; efficiency; relevance 
to need; equity; accessibility; and capacity for 
system change. Another investor, working in the 
microfinance arena, explicitly identified a possible 
negative relation between financial and social 
value, by creating a ‘traffic light’ system that 
raised concerns if financial profitability was high 
due to clients being charged high interest rates. 
With such disparate impact areas and themes to 
consider, it can be seen why the integration of many 
different social returns into a single metric alone 
was seen as difficult by many interviewees (even 
in the case of a Social Impact Bond scheme, with 
payment against a specific metric, it was generally 
felt useful to track a number of indicators, some 
qualitative, that presented a more holistic picture 
of progress). 
Only one interviewee saw it as possible to compare 
different social goals against one another, and 
even they used a framework that very much relied 
on expert judgement. One investor that had spent 
much time considering SROI felt that its key 
strengths were in initiating debate and providing 
insight into the most important aspects of the 
value created by the activities, much as the logic 
chain process does (though in a less top-down 
way), rather than providing a quantified fixed 
‘Answer’. 
Instead, a much more popular approach was to 
take a single social metric, and track performance 
against this as well as financial outcomes. 
PhiTrust, for example, tracks CO2  offsets in its 
Alter Eco investment; the scale of employment of 
people with disabilities at its ecodair investment; 
and the number of socially inclusive jobs created 
at its La Varappe investment.
2.7  Causal linkages between 
activity and outcomes 
Investors differed in how they used the term 
‘impact’ to infer a proven causal relationship 
with the intervention or activities provided by 
their investees. Impact was consistently used in 
the context of an underlying impact value chain 
or logic model, but sometimes this impact was 
inferred rather than proven, and perspectives 
differed between an assumption of better 
outcomes per se; and a desire for a proven and 
measurable link between activities and changes 
in outcomes. 
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One microfinance investor we spoke to argued 
that there is strong evidence for microfinance 
generally improving access to finance, so 
enabling individuals to rise out of poverty when 
entrepreneurial opportunities arise, or at the very 
least, enabling them to mitigate the worst effects 
of volatility in income. The implication was that 
impact studies, and measures of social outcomes, 
were not needed. Instead, the focus was on fidelity 
to good standards of practice and the volume of 
appropriate loans made. 
A perspective of an automatic link was also seen 
in respect of various renewable energy supplies 
(such as wind power); as well as in a social 
enterprise promoting environmentally-friendly 
travel. Hackney Community Transport (HCT) 
operates commercial bus routes in London, and is 
an investment of Bridges Ventures. HCT reduces 
the need for car journeys through the use of buses 
and community group transport, and makes 
particular efforts to employ people in areas of 
traditionally high unemployment.6 Hence, HCT 
argues that commercial success naturally implies 
a corresponding increase in the beneficial social 
impact.  
One investor argued for close links in the short-
term, but uncertainty over long-term linkages. 
That investee gave the example of microcredit to 
farmers in Kenya, often as a means to buy dairy 
cattle. The immediate effect is that the farmers 
have access to capital to finance their work, and 
this was seen as beneficial in itself. The extent to 
which they escaped poverty, however, was seen as 
highly dependent on sometimes volatile external 
circumstances – whether farmers could gain fair 
access to markets for dairy products; whether 
corruption was under control; the effects of 
weather and external competition. 
Microfinance also highlighted possible tensions 
between ‘analytical rigour’ and ‘analytical 
resilience to different conditions’. One interviewee 
dismissed results from a randomized control 
trial by saying “we do our investing in different 
geographies, with different clients, using different 
loan standards and different processes. The RCT 
6 http://www.bridgesventures.com/investment/hct-
group Accessed 26/11/2013
is irrelevant.” Similarly, another interviewee 
described those looking for academic standards of 
robustness as “aiming for the impossible”.
In a similar way, underpinned by a ‘theory of 
change’ perspective, Quadia relies upon a large 
amount of qualitative and contextual data to 
inform its judgements; visiting the business, 
speaking to beneficiaries and experts, and using 
international initiatives and industry goals 
as  benchmarks, as well as drawing up specific 
metrics for each investment. 
By contrast, at the ‘hard edged’ end of the 
spectrum, an investor on social impact bond 
projects spoke of the vital need to see a track 
record with a proven and measurable link 
between the organisation’s intervention and the 
targeted impact - which in this instance related 
to education attainment, ongoing employment 
and training. Such an approach sometimes makes 
use of ‘intermediate outcomes’ (such as increased 
confidence, or an increased sense of purpose in life 
among the clients); but one interviewee stressed 
that while such intermediate outcomes were very 
useful, it was the ‘hard, final outcomes’ such as 
education results and employment that were what 
really counted.
This question of appropriate methodological 
practice on what should be aimed for and what 
can be aimed for in terms of evidence on causal 
linkages highlighted major differences of opinion 
between interviewees. Some investors with a 
strong quantitative metrics perspective were 
dismissive of ‘case by case’ approaches, arguing 
that they were ‘not really impact investors’ and 
that their approach was too often reminiscent of 
‘throwing mud against the wall and seeing what 
sticks’. The different perspectives to evidencing 
causal links can be viewed in terms of positioning 
across a spectrum for ‘standards of evidence’, 
identified by the UK impact investor, NESTA, 
based on the work of the Social Research Unit at 
Dartington7  which is set out below in Table 1.
7 http://www.nestainvestments.org.uk/our-approach-
to-impact-and-evidence/our-standards-of-evidence/
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Table 1 – NESTA Impact Investment 
Fund’s Standards of Evidence
NESTA Investment Management accepts that 
many investees will initially have little more than 
a narrative description of their social impact; but 
pushes strongly for before-and-after evidence 
within a period of about 18 months, and looks to 
see evidence with respect to a control group within 
three years. A medium to long term goal is that all 
its investees will have a complete specification of 
their service, allowing high fidelity replication.
Similar views were held by other respondents: 
one felt that there were ‘major flaws’ in respect of 
attitudes to attribution; another that it would take 
perhaps five years to get much more widespread 
use of RCT or ‘similarly rigorous’ approaches in 
impact investing. 
One investor queried whether investing to develop 
impact systems was the most effective use of their 
investor’s funds, when it could instead be used 
to finance expansion or growth, which would 
potentially have a more direct effect on the scale 
of reach. A comment frequently heard was that 
investors very much hope that their investees 
would themselves appreciate the value of better 
impact measurement in strengthening their 
operations and refining their strategies. 
 
2.8 Differences in  
pre-investment and  
post-investment assessment
We found few examples of investors who 
undertook the same level of impact assessment 
after funds had been invested as they did during 
the due diligence process. The reasons for this 
varied – some argued that it was too resource 
intensive for either or both the investee and the 
investors; others felt it was an ineffective use of 
investor funds or not particularly relevant given 
the investor’s approach to impact. A further issue 
mentioned by two investors was the lack of impact 
understanding and skills across investment teams. 
Investment managers tend to be drawn from the 
mainstream finance sector, with assessment of 
impact being left to a dedicated professional who 
may sit alongside, or more often outside the core 
team managing the investments.
While data on outcomes and performance was 
received on a regular basis, few of the investors 
had the resources to revisit or examine the impact 
evidence in detail after the initial investment. 
It was commented by several investors that 
there was no surplus funding available after 
delivering the return to the investor and covering 
management costs. It was suggested by one 
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investor that venture philanthropy organisation 
are in a different position and more likely to have 
ultimate funders for whom spending money on 
impact systems is consistent with achieving their 
objectives. For instance, one organisation with 
a strong social stance, Big Issue Invest, supports 
its investees during the first year of an investment 
to access pro bono support or find alternative 
sources of funding to finance the development of 
appropriate tracking systems. 
One investor believed that a more efficient use of 
resources was to help the investee to embed their 
social mission across their entire business model 
and by improving its operational capacity which 
will give it a greater likelihood of long term growth 
and impact. One major exception to this occurred 
with Social Impact Bond investors. At least one 
of these made clear that it took an ongoing close 
look at performance, and had mechanisms in 
place to raise concerns with the impact creator to 
ensure that satisfactory results were obtained. It is 
important to note that in the case of social impact 
bonds the financial return is explicitly linked to 
the social returns so ongoing tracking of output 
and outcome metrics is fundamental to the design 
of the investment.
For investors who are satisfied by an organisation’s 
capacity to deliver impact a more critical focus of 
impact metrics is to ensure there is no mission drift. 
Typical practice – as is undertaken by the DOB 
Foundation, for example - is to select a number of 
bespoke KPIs which cover outputs, outcomes as 
far as possible, and mission adherence. No attempt 
is made by such investors to integrate social and 
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financial return into a coherent single metric as 
highlighted by several interviewees. 
Some investors, such as some of those we spoke to 
who are investing in ‘clean fuels’, see no role for 
outcome metrics at all. They are content that the 
desired impact (on reducing greenhouse gases) 
will follow, and see no need to reinvent the wheel 
by requesting another impact study. Operational 
competence, growth and model fidelity were of 
great importance. Microfinance, for instance, has 
well established standards for client protection 
which many interviewees mentioned.
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) provided 
an example of the approach undertaken by a 
mainstream financial organization with respect 
to sustainable business models. BAML have 
a target of achieving $50 billion of business 
between 2012 and 2022 that “address climate 
change, reduce demands on natural resources 
and advance lower-carbon economic solutions” 
– as part of their normal economic transactions, 
rather than as a dedicated investment approach. 
BAML commission a ‘top four’ consultancy firm 
to conduct an independent assessment of the 
expected environmental impact of a transaction, 
but feel that the sheer scale of their environmental 
investments would make more tracking of impact 
post-investment  highly burdensome. 
By contrast, there are other investors who adopted 
some standard outcome metrics that constituted 
their core approach, supplemented by bespoke 
metrics to capture a more rounded picture. The 
most ambitious attempt that we are aware of is 
that being piloted by PGGM (see box 1).
Every investor that we spoke to expected its 
investees to submit an annual impact report 
outlining its performance versus agreed key 
performance indicators. Phi Trust Partenaire 
requires investees to report output metrics on 
a half yearly basis with a full impact report 
encompassing outcome measures on an annual 
basis. One reason for the relatively infrequent 
reporting is the regular informal contact with 
their investees; other investors requested more 
regular progress reports - investors in social 
impact bonds are likely to receive information 
on a timescale ranging from weekly to quarterly. 
2.9 Groups and networks to 
enhance impact measurement 
practice
Groups and networks (such as IRIS) were seen 
as potentially promoting better practice in 
respect of generating shared outcome metrics; 
disseminating information; and creating 
partnerships for research. The recent GIIN 
Investor Forum that took place in London 
2013 was referred to as having been a positive 
platform for sharing best practice and educating 
the wider impact investor community of issues 
underpinning impact assessment. It should, 
however, be noted that a caveat was raised by 
one investor, who spoke of a risk that umbrella 
groups could be ‘more talk than action’. 
Nonetheless, potential for improvement though 
was identified, particularly with respect to three 
themes which we consider in turn.
Developing usable and better 
quality outcome metrics
These are seen as an area of much active work 
over recent years. The microfinance industry has 
a high degree of buy-in to the social performance 
taskforce standards, and reporting of that 
data in a shareable way. Views seem split on 
future directions however – some microfinance 
investors said they would value more granular 
data; others were sceptical of taking standardised 
metrics too seriously.
The work of Big Society Capital in gathering 
directories of metrics (Ogain et al, 2013) has also 
been seen as a key step. Several investors found 
these metrics listings to be a useful resource, 
and an effective prompt in thinking of new ways 
of measuring outcomes. 
Nonetheless, most investors were sceptical of the 
value of introducing a single measure of impact 
whilst the majority of investment funds continue 
to invest across a broad range of impact areas. It 
was felt that any resulting indicators would be 
at best misleading (as the underlying context 
for investment and market conditions would be 
overlooked) and at worse a case of comparing 
apples and pears. 
Many investors agreed that outcomes in some 
key themes, such as loneliness, were still difficult 
to quantify, and investors felt that it was often 
beyond their capabilities, or at least “not their job”, 
to create new metrics of this kind. The majority of 
investors interviewed felt that this remained an 
area where more effort could be undertaken. 
Disseminating information
Data availability and possible computer 
applications was raised by many interviewees. 
Of those who took more of the ‘case by case’ 
perspective, the main request was for the 
development of practical tools to allow those on 
the ground to collect data in a way that was not too 
onerous, but effective, including ‘near neighbour’ 
benchmarks. 
Several interviewees raised the valuable role that 
meta-analyses could play, particularly when it 
could authoritatively highlight powerful messages 
as to ‘what works’. In this context, the synthesis 
study disseminated by the Education Endowment 
Foundation toolkit8  was noted as a clear, simple, 
effective star rating system (a similar, though 
more academic perspective can be seen in John 
Hattie’s 2009 book ‘Visible Learning’, published 
by Routledge). It was, however, felt by at least 
one investor that ‘trusted intermediaries’ were 
essential to fulfil the potential of this strand of 
work, and that, unfortunately, the history of 
‘commons initiatives’ was not encouraging.
8 http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/
toolkit/
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Partnerships for research
A small number of investors in our sample are 
making substantial efforts to be much more rigorous 
in their approach. They aim to raise standards of 
evidence and practice to the levels they feel generate 
‘real knowledge’. They are generally to find ways to 
get the most ‘high quality’ evidence (most notably 
Randomised Control trials, and to a lesser extent 
multiple replication), although they often struggle to 
fund such research activities themselves. 
Indeed no impact investors we spoke to are doing 
anything that could be described as an impact study 
as part of their ordinary investment process, with the 
exception of some investors in social impact. Instead 
they were forging alliances with others who might 
fund the impact study element, including research 
councils and charities – though sometimes hampered 
by central governments not doing enough to improve 
access to longitudinal, individual (but anonymized) 
citizens data. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
The organisations interviewed represent only a small 
selection of impact investors in Europe, and were not 
chosen on a random sample basis, which rules out 
the possibility of making definitive judgements. The 
measurement practice and insights provided through 
the interviews do, however, provide an independent 
perspective on the six propositions outlined on page 1 
of this paper. The extent to which these propositions 
are supported, rejected and/or amended are 
discussed in turn below, as well as other findings in 
respect of impact measurement methodology.
An emerging typology for 
distinguishing impact investors
From our analysis of how interviewees incorporated 
impact measurement into their investment process, 
we suggest that there is emerging typology for 
distinguishing between impact investors. This can 
be broken down into three distinct approaches: those 
that are focused on system building, those that assess 
each investment on a case by case basis, and those 
that follow the evidence of what works. It is important 
to note that while this typology will drive how an 
investor approaches an individual investment, they 
are not mutually exclusive and it is possible as an 
investor to adopt one, two or all three approaches. 
For instance, an investment fund may invest in 
social enterprises on a case by case basis, but also 
be an investor in a social impact bond. 
System builders
A few investors - Bridges, Impetus – PEF, NESTA, 
and Triple Jump – appeared to be advocates of 
a ‘system building’ approach. Their view was 
that a rigorously well specified and replicable 
approach is the right way to attack their chosen 
goal, though much more analysis was needed to 
achieve this. These investors are very interested 
both understanding exactly how and where the 
intervention works, and developing the best 
evidence for it. They do this to improve their own 
allocation of capital, but perhaps more importantly 
to facilitate the scaling of the idea. They tend 
to put the most resources into measurement, 
reach for the most rigour, and have the most 
standardised outcome metrics. As generating 
high quality evidence is costly, investors in this 
area tend to either be highly socially minded, or 
have alternative sources of funding (most notably, 
trusts and foundations).  
Case by case
Investors such as DOB, Social Venture fund, 
and Alterfin tend to see the ‘most rigorous’ 
measurement practices as inappropriate. Instead, 
their focus has been on understanding the 
particular context around a given intervention. 
General metrics tend to be chosen on a case by 
case basis, and need to be interpreted in the 
context of expert judgement informed about that 
locality. Investors in this space, such as Big Issue 
Invest or Phi Trust Partenaire, are more likely to 
adopt a pragmatic approach to monitoring impact 
and caution the need for systems and processes 
to be proportionate to the benefits they achieve. 
In a similar vein, Ashoka treats each social 
entrepreneur as different, and looks individually 
at the contribution that each Fellow has made to 
achieving social change. 
Evidence followers
Our interviews have highlighted a third category 
not indicated in Reeder and Colantonio (2013), 
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namely ‘evidence followers’, who believe that 
they are applying a technique that is already well 
evidenced and well specified, and that further 
evidence would be redundant, or that the impact is 
so obvious that it does not need it. These investors 
are more interested in measures of fidelity to the 
operational model, and operational stability and 
execution than in impact studies. This includes 
clean tech investors, as well as investors in some of 
the more recent social impact bonds – for example 
the recent Essex social impact bond, where the 
intervention in question has a well-established 
evidence base that is informed by RCTs as well as 
other analyses. 
Forms of measurement practice 
culture
Those interviewed included some that were 
passionately in favour of treating impact 
measurement as a practice that should be applied 
on a deep qualitative basis, taking contextual 
factors heavily into account. Equally, the 
interviewees included some that were passionate 
about using sophisticated analysis to get a ‘better 
handle on what works’.  
Such views were anticipated in the first working 
paper of this series. What was not anticipated was 
a third category, ‘evidence followers’, who were 
confident of a direct link between finance on the 
one hand, and social and environmental return 
(SER) on the other, and so felt it much less useful 
to measure SER. 
This third category was particularly predominant 
around those that were major investors in ‘clean 
energy’ technology, where outcomes such as 
reductions in CO2 emissions can be engineered 
with precision. What is less clear, however, is the 
extent to which those engaged with addressing 
social problems can justify that social impact 
must proportionately follow economic impact. 
An important case of that assumption coming 
under question is microfinance; after highly 
publicised cases of clients committing suicide as 
a result of taking on too much debt9 , this field is 
taking serious steps (led by initiatives such as the 
‘Social Performance Task Force’), towards taking 
9 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/31/
india-microfinance-debt-struggle-suicide
the subtleties of ethics and context much more 
seriously.
Concepts of what should be measured and 
covered within ‘impact’ and ‘non-financial return’ 
or ‘wider value’ are far from settled
Interviewees had a highly varied range of 
attributes covered within impact. Some, such 
as NESTA, put emphasis on empowerment in 
priority groups (older and young people). Others 
felt that the most important attribute was the 
ability to increase employment in target areas. 
Some felt that indirect long-term systemic effects 
were crucial; others neglected these in favour of 
direct effects here and now.
What is most striking to the authors of this paper, 
however, is the low level of engagement that 
impact investors seem to have with the ultimate 
beneficiaries of their social impact. It may well 
be that they share the priorities of the impact 
investor, but this should not be assumed to be the 
case. While SROI was not a tool widely used by the 
investors interviewed, its methodology of asking 
views from a wide range of stakeholders implies 
fewer assumptions are being made as to what 
impact should be valued. 
In addition, the connections, actual or perceived, 
between non-financial and financial returns are 
a key factor in determining what impact gets 
measured, and the effort put into measurement. 
Such a connection is clearest with social impact 
bonds, where financial return is explicitly linked 
to one or more metrics of social outcomes, and the 
effort placed on evaluating this link can therefore 
be very substantial. By contrast, a comment by 
Triodos Investment Management that ‘we see 
profit as proof of a healthy organisation, but not 
as an end in itself’, puts the financial and non-
financial on a more level footing, where each are 
viewed as important in themselves, as well as for 
their relationship to one another.  
Conceptual frameworks have often 
downplayed the category of risk
Our interviews showed signs that investors are 
beginning to place greater importance on impact 
risk, with emerging frameworks that explicitly 
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take this issue into account by looking for ‘robust 
evidence’ on what works. Similarly, investors with 
a focus on social impact bonds tend to take a close 
look at both the robustness of the evidence, and the 
extent to which it highlights volatility in outcomes. 
Data on past track records is being used to predict 
what is likely to happen to outcomes and associated 
payments. Such explicit modelling of outcome risk 
remains the exception rather than the rule, however, 
among impact investors.
Use of ‘subjective’ as well as ‘objective’ 
outcomes
Perhaps as a consequence of different measurement 
cultures, our interviewees showed different levels of 
willingness to adopt ‘subjective’ outcomes in their 
assessments. For instance, while Ashoka is happy to 
include a relatively subjective term such as ‘ethical 
fibre’ in its decision-making, other investors are 
much more comfortable at assessing such objective 
effects as ‘the extent of reoffending’, and find it hard 
to measure intrinsic motivation and wellbeing. 
The conceptual case for creating a single 
metric of value is highly contested
Those interviewed for this paper showed little, if any, 
enthusiasm for creating a single metric of (social) 
value. Much more emphasis is instead being placed 
on the development of suitable scorecards that 
can capture the elements that are felt by investors 
to be of most value in the given investment under 
consideration. 
Tensions between bespoke and standard 
measurement systems 
Our group of interviewees clearly showed that 
tensions between bespoke and standardised 
measurement systems remain prevalent.  For 
instance, on the one hand one investor cautioned 
against expecting too much from IRIS’s attempts to 
standardisation, because investees have too much 
flexibility to choose an indicator that puts them in a 
good light; and too much flexibility in how they assess 
the chosen indicators. By contrast, on the other hand 
another investor argued that it was only through 
more standardisation and benchmarking that ‘real 
learning’ would take place. Resolving this tension 
will be a major challenge for those institutions 
(such as IRIS / GIIN and Big Society Capital) that 
are currently doing the most to promote greater 
standardisation in measurement.
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